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Introduction
Two statements can confidently be made about the Irish economy of the
late 1990s.  First, Ireland, according to all accepted international economic
indicators, has become a wealthy country.  Second, it has become more
closely linked - in economics jargon, more integrated - in the European,
and the global, economy than ever before.  Some 25 years after Ireland's
joining the European Community, this is a good time to stand back and
review the contribution of economic integration to the Irish economy.
Have closer economic links with Europe and the wider world added to
Ireland's prosperity?  Will deepening this involvement - through the Single
Market, through international agreements brokered through the World
Trade Organisation, through expansion of the European Union to include
Eastern Europe, and through Economic and Monetary Union - consolidate
our new-found prosperity?  Or will it, as some fear, lead to more job
insecurity, rootlessness, and vulnerability to the ups and downs of the
global economy?   The evidence to date suggests that global free trade in
goods and services, and the opening of international capital markets will,
on balance, improve the economic position of Irish people.  But the gains
from trade do not occur automatically, and there will be continuing need
for good economic management (McAleese, 1986a, 1987).
How trade creates prosperity
Within the short span of 40 years, Ireland has changed from being a
relatively inward-oriented economy to one of the most open and trade-
dependent economies in the world.  In 1998, exports from Ireland
amounted to IR£48 billion, equivalent to 90 per cent of Gross Domestic2
Product (GDP).  As recently as 1994 the export/GDP ratio was 65 per
cent, then considered a high figure, and in 1964 it  was only 32 per cent
(McAleese and Hayes, 1995).  Imports have also grown rapidly, but less
so than exports.  They totalled IR£40 billion in 1998.  Like many
countries, Ireland's trade growth has been driven primarily by two-way
exchange of rather similar goods (intra-industry trade), much of it
involving transactions between different branches of multinational firms
(Brülhart and McAleese, 1995).
This two-way expansion of trade has brought several benefits to the
economy.  First, productivity of people employed in Irish manufacturing
and agriculture has leaped ahead.  Trade has enabled, and indeed forced,
Irish business to become more specialised and efficient and to employ best
practice techniques used by their foreign competitors.  Second, the need to
survive against stiff international competition in an open international
market ensures that Irish business upgrades productivity by staying abreast
of best international practice.  Third, the Irish consumer has benefited
through cheaper goods in the shops.  Also, the range of choice has been
vastly extended.  For example, the ability to import from literally the five
continents means that goods such as clothing are available in our high
streets at relatively cheap prices.  One no longer needs to be rich to dress
smartly.
Imports have brought one further important benefit: they have enabled
Irish people to enjoy the fruits of technological innovation developed
outside Ireland.  Think of the personal computer.  The cost of developing
the computer has fallen almost entirely on wealthier countries such as the3
United States.  Because of foreign trade, the Irish PC user can enjoy the
latest technology at falling prices without incurring any of the huge
development costs which others have had to incur.  In general we can say
that more open economies like Ireland have greater opportunities of
benefiting from new ideas and techniques developed abroad than more
closed economies.  Economists have come to regard this as one of the
most powerful reasons explaining why open economies have tended to
outperform closed economies (International Monetary Fund, 1993).
Trade in services
The process of integration has extended far beyond free trade in goods.
International trade in services has also been growing and currently
accounts for one-quarter of total trade.  Services trade includes tourism,
transport, consultancy, financial and insurance activities.  Entirely new
service industries have appeared on the Irish scene, such as the
International Financial Services Centre in Dublin, already employing over
3000 people, and telemarketing.   The growth in such activities can be
explained in the first instance by advances in technology which have
reduced the cost of transport and communication between countries.
Another factor has been the realisation that an efficient services sector is
important for economic development and that such efficiency can best be
assured by opening hitherto protected sectors to foreign competition.  The
European Commission has played a lead role in driving this message home
and through a series of directives has forced several reluctant governments
(including the Irish government) to remove restrictions on competition in
transport, telecom, and banking and insurance.  As a result of such
liberalisation, cost of inputs to Irish exporters have fallen, Irish industry4
has become more competitive and all sorts of new products and activities
(the mobile phone for instance) have been spawned.  Here is another
advantage of openness, not mentioned in the textbooks.
Financial transfers
As part of the integration process, Ireland has benefited from financial
transfers from the EU on an unprecedented scale.  These transfers have
taken two main forms: resources received from the various Structural
Funds and financial supports from the Common Agricultural Policy.  Net
receipts from the EU have amounted to a staggering £12 billion since 1990
alone, equal to a free gift of £3,500 to every person in Ireland, with
virtually no political strings attached.  Few countries have ever received
largesse on such a grand scale.  The objective of the Structural Funds is to
achieve economic convergence, i.e. convergence of living standards, so
that the recipients can play a full and equal part in the progress of the
European Union.  The only obligation on the Irish government has been to
spend the money in a manner agreed with Brussels in advance.  Far from
proving onerous or intrusive this obligation has led to a considerable
improvement in the way public sector investment is planned and monitored
(Honohan 1997).
Trade and foreign investment
Free trade and what is called the internationalisation of production often
go hand in hand, and Irish experience is no exception to this rule.
Subsidiaries of foreign multinationals account for one out of every two
jobs in Irish manufacturing, and for 40% of our total export earnings.  The5
US influence has been particularly marked.  Some 50,000 Irish people
have found well-paying jobs in US subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector
alone (Ruane and Görg, 1997).  American subsidiaries are visible
throughout the length and breadth of Ireland.
Foreign investors are attracted to Ireland for several reasons.  First, they
can use Ireland’s secure access to the EU and other foreign markets as a
platform from which to export to these markets.  (The Irish market on its
own is far too small to attract any significant volume of inward
manufacturing investment.)  Second, Ireland's well-educated, motivated
and English-speaking workforce also encourages inward investment.
Third, overseas investors have been attracted by Ireland's low corporate
taxes.  These and other advantages of the economy have been skilfully
marketed by the IDA over many years (Kennedy 1998).  Recent
experience shows that, as more investors come to Ireland, more tend to
follow.  Partly this is because of agglomeration economies - as the number
of new firms increases, infrastructure is developed which lowers costs for
followers.  Partly it arises because of informational economies.  If one
well-known multinational locates in Ireland, its competitors conclude that
Ireland must be a good place to invest in - and they follow suit.
1
Foreign investment, however, does not come cheaply.  More countries
than ever before are trying to attract foreign investors and, for the right
type of investment project, Ireland must either pay the going rate, or lose
                                                       
1  Krugman (1997) describes this in terms of 'demonstration' and 'cascade' effects.  These
effects have been well appreciated by the IDA for many years.  A point not sufficiently
emphasised by Krugman is the importance of the first entrant being a leader in the industry if
these effects are to swing into action.6
the project.  Grants, subsidies and tax incentives totalling many millions
had to be provided by the taxpayer.  So far the balance between the gains
and costs from foreign investment has rested in Ireland's favour.  The Irish
Exchequer has certainly gained from their presence.   In 1994, for instance,
corporate tax receipts from IDA-supported companies of IR£440milllion,
while grants provided to them amounted to IR£73m (IDA Annual Report
1995).
With so much foreign industry in Ireland, it is not surprising that questions
are regularly raised about the vulnerability of the Irish economy to changes
in economic conditions abroad or simply to altered foreign sentiment about
Ireland's attractiveness as an investment location.  But such worries are
misplaced.  There is no evidence that foreign industry is more volatile than
Irish-owned industry - because of its stronger resources, the opposite is
more likely to be the case.  Also, foreign investment engenders many
positive spillover effects on Irish-owned companies.  Multinationals have
helped small Irish firms to develop expertise as suppliers.  They have also
given job experience and training to a cohort of talented young people.  In
other instances, by taking over small Irish companies, they have provided a
significant financial reward for the entrepreneurs who started these
companies, and encouraged others to follow.  While it is true to some
extent that industry in Ireland suffers from the Wimbledon syndrome -- too
many international players and not enough local winners -- the locals are
fighting back.
Foreign investment has been a two-way process.  While foreign firms
invest in Ireland, Irish firms are investing overseas, at an increasingly rapid7
rate.  Most firms quoted in the Irish Stock Exchange have acquired
substantial investment positions abroad.  Irish multinationals such as
Smurfits, CRH, Kerry Foods, Glen Dimplex, Bank of Ireland and AIB
derive only a fraction of their profits from their Irish operations.
Subsidiaries of Irish food companies supply 18% of the UK liquid milk
market, 30% of the UK cheese market, and an estimated 55% of the UK
red meat market (Irish Farmers Journal, 27 December 1997).
Unfortunately we still await a comprehensive economic analysis of the
effects of this surge in outward investment on the Irish economy.  My
guess is that such a study would show that overseas investment makes a
positive contribution to the economy by enabling Irish companies to
diversify risk, to learn first-hand from foreign business practice, and to
escape the confines of the small Irish market.
A key development in recent years has been the growth of foreign
investment in the services sector.  The influx of major British multiples
such as Marks and Spencers, Dixons and Tesco into the Irish market has
had a huge impact on the Irish retail market, and further incursions from
overseas are likely in hitherto "closed" sectors such as telecoms and
energy.  Because less evidently advantageous than greenfield investment in
economic terms, such investment receives no support from the Irish
government.  Yet, by exposing the Irish market to more intense
competition, it can bring economic significant gains to the Irish consumer.
As integration continues, we can expect deeper penetration by overseas
firms of our financial sector and, within the next decade, it is quite possible
that Irish banks, building societies and insurance sectors will be entirely
under foreign control.  Already, most Irish shopping centres are mere8
replicas of those found in any British city.  All this may make for greater
efficiency and lower prices - but also for a rather duller, less distinctive
and less economically independent Ireland.  This is another aspect of the
integration process that deserves further research.
Portfolio capital flows
As nations trade more intensively, capital moves with it.  Banks help to
finance foreign trade and, when major companies invest abroad, domestic
banks tend to follow their customers and become international themselves
- witness the proliferation of foreign banks in the wake of the multinational
inflows into Ireland.  Borrowing and lending in foreign currencies becomes
increasingly easy for governments, firms and individuals.
While the Treaty of Rome involved a commitment to freedom of capital
movements, little was done to implement this provision prior to the Single
European Act of 1987.  Indeed, only since the early 1990s has capital
become fully mobile between Ireland and the outside world.  The effects
have been quite startling.  Nowadays, the humblest Irish citizen can invest
in equities and bonds from every part of the globe, through a myriad of
exotic investment funds.  Irish pension funds have increased their overseas
holdings to over 40% of their total assets of IR£19 billion, and the process
of international diversification of Irish investment funds follows apace.
The Irish government's debt agency, the NTMA, scours the world market
for the cheapest source of funds.  Transactions between companies involve
huge two-way flows of money in and out of Ireland.  Irish banks too are
heavily involved in the global capital market - by mid-1997, their gross
liabilities to non-residents amounted to IR£50 billion.9
The abolition of capital controls means that Irish capital is free to go to
where it can make the highest return and to diversify risk.  This freedom to
borrow and lend abroad has brought economic benefits to Irish individuals
and Irish companies by enabling them to diversify their portfolios and
maximise the return on capital.  It has also helped to ensure that the
government keeps its finances in good order.  Any hint of reversion to the
irresponsible fiscal policies of the past would lead to prompt capital
outflows, higher interest rates for Irish borrowers, and a very clear
negative signal to the public about the government's performance.  As an
Italian economist once remarked, "capital markets have the heart of a
lamb, the legs of a hare, and the memory of an elephant".  Another
benefit of capital mobility stems from its stabilising role in the economy.
When the Irish economy is booming, profits flow out of Ireland to the
outside world.  When the rest of the world is booming and Irish economy
is relatively depressed, profits from capital invested abroad flow in,
domestic activity is bolstered by increased income.  Thus Irish consumers
find their spending evened out over the business cycle (Lane 1998).
A less edifying effect of international capital movement has been to make
individual capital transactions increasingly difficult to trace and tax.  The
byzantine financial paths described in the McCracken Tribunal Report
(1997) illustrated the difficulty in a graphic way.  As a result, tax evasion
and avoidance of taxation have become easier than before.  Governments
in high tax jurisdictions are under pressure to reduce tax rates so as to
minimise the incentives to transfer capital to lower tax jurisdictions.  The
danger of a resultant “race to the bottom”, or fiscal degradation, has
caused concern in the European Union, and initiatives are in progress to10
secure closer co-ordination of capital taxation policies among member
states.  Globalisation of the private sector, in other words, must be
matched by globalisation of public policy.
From Emigration to Immigration
No description of Ireland's integration with the outside world would be
complete without reference to movements of people, or in economic
jargon, labour mobility.  For most of the past two centuries, migration
meant outward movement, or emigration.  There is continuing debate
about the effects of emigration on the economies to which the Irish
emigrated, on the living standards of emigrants and, most controversial of
all, on the living standards of those left behind.  Emigration can certainly
generate some positive effects in the short run, such as a reduction in the
level of unemployment and a mitigation of the decline in living standards
during recessions.  The longer run effects are more difficult to quantify.
But such evidence as exists offers no compelling support for the commonly
held view that emigration has impaired the long-run development of the
economy, or the growth of income per person (NESC 1991).
Movements of people, like movements of capital, can go both ways.  As
the Irish economy has grown in prosperity, it has become a magnet for
returning Irish emigrants, for skilled Europeans willing to work in the
computer and teleservices industries, and also for large numbers of
relatively unskilled people from poorer nations.  Increasingly one sees
advertisements for jobs in Dublin bars and restaurants specifying that
"fluency in English is essential".11
Being a recipient, rather than a source, of surplus labour has proven a
disturbingly novel experience for Ireland.  The phenomenon is too recent
to enable any proper assessment of its economic impact.  Inflows of skilled
people, many of them returning emigrants, are clearly beneficial to the
economy.  However, the economic calculus becomes less clear when it
comes to judging the value of immigrants who are unskilled, yet ready and
eager to work.  First, Ireland has an abundance of unskilled people
already, languishing in unemployment, and it is reasonable to give them
priority ahead of economic immigrants (political refugees are of course
another matter).  Second, we must ensure that unskilled immigrants find
work which will enable them to make the same positive contribution to
society as generations of Irish have done in Britain and the United States.
Were they to lapse into welfare dependency and long term unemployment,
we would lose and so would they in the long run.
As a general rule, economics suggests that moving capital, technology and
goods between countries is likely to be less costly and disruptive in social
terms than moving people.  As the slogan goes, jobs should go to people
rather than people to jobs.  But when jobs won't move, people of ambition
have no choice but to up and go themselves.
EMU - the next step
The next step in the integration process is the introduction of a single
currency, the euro, and economic and monetary union (EMU).  The
surrender of the Irish pound and its replacement by the euro is proving to
be a difficult and controversial step.12
It is a difficult step because introducing a new currency will be a costly
nuisance for every single individual and every single business in the
country.  By the year 2002, all prices will have to be quoted in euros.
Automatic teller machines and accounting systems will have to be adjusted
to transactions in euros.  The cost of this has been estimated at several
hundred million pounds.  It will have to be borne by the private sector and
ultimately, one suspects, by ordinary consumers - Brussels has made clear
that it will not foot the bill.  The transition process will create opportunities
for confusion, fraud and unwarranted price increases as uneven and
awkward figures are rounded up.  Economists tend to see these costs as
similar to the upfront costs of launching a new product, which should be
capitalised and written off against a future stream of benefits lasting for
many generations.  Viewed this way, the costs of the transition come out
as fairly small.
EMU has also proved controversial.  The controversy about Ireland's
participation in EMU is intriguing in two respects.  First, it has divided
Irish economists to a degree which no other European initiative has done
since membership of the European Community was proposed in the late
1950s.  Second, opponents of EMU entry seem to have been uniquely
ineffective in changing policy makers' minds.  Ireland's main policy
political parties, business representatives and trade unions remain as firmly
pro-EMU as ever.  Fascinating material here, surely, for future economists
and political scientists!
There are three standard economic benefits to Ireland of EMU.  First, trade
and foreign investment with the 11 member states in EMU will be easier13
and less expensive to transact in a single currency with zero exchange rate
risk.  Second, the euro will make it easier for people to compare prices in
different parts of Europe.  Price transparency will ensure that competition
is intensified and prices are kept low.  Third, over the long run, the
elimination of exchange rate risk will reduce Irish interest rates (by
somewhere between 1 and 2 percentage points).  This will stimulate
investment and generate faster growth.  Proponents of EMU have found
this third advantage to be crucial to the cost-benefit analysis of EMU
(Baker et al, 1996; De Buitleir et al, 1995).  My own view is that the first
two sources of gain could prove ultimately far more important than current
estimates suggest!
Against this are ranged two main drawbacks.
2  One derives from Irish
firms' vulnerability to changes in sterling given that Britain has decided to
opt out of EMU.  Business was badly scarred by the weakness of sterling
in 1992-93 and also in 1986, and many firms had extreme difficulty in
coping with a rate of one Irish pound equal to 110p sterling.  Had the
single currency been in operation in 1992, Irish firms would have had to
cope with the equivalent of 115-120p sterling per IR£ through much of
1995 and 1996.  This would undoubtedly have proved a traumatic
experience.  In recent times, sterling has strengthened, but the possibility
of it weakening again cannot be ruled out.
                                                       
2 The case against Ireland joining EMU is made in Thom (1997), Neary and Thom (1998) and
Neary (1997).  It is worth noting that those articulating the case are by no means anti-
European in the colloquial sense of that term.  Some, like Neary, happily describe themselves
as Europhiles, with emphasis on the capital E of course!14
Another objection to EMU is that it will result in inappropriate interest
rates for the Irish economy.  A booming economy ideally needs higher
interest rates to cool things down.  But, after EMU, the Irish central bank
will surrender control of monetary policy to the European central bank.
Interest rates will be determined by the needs of the European, not the
Irish, economy.  While all members of EMU will be in the same position
in this respect, the Irish economy has been weakly synchronised with
average EU economic conditions in the past and hence, the argument goes,
conflict is likely to arise often in future.  Thus when we need high interest
rates, we are likely to get lower rates, and vice versa.
There would be general agreement that going into EMU has potential
downsides.  But opponents of EMU tend to underplay the equally serious
downsides of staying out.
First, there is the risk that foreign investors would be put off by what
would be perceived as a weakening commitment to Europe and a danger,
however remote and ill-defined, that Ireland might suffer from not being
close to the centre of decision-taking in European monetary policy.  The
IDA claims that that failure to participate in EMU would have a serious
adverse affect on inward investment.
Second, abstention from EMU might weaken the government's
commitment to fiscal control and a lower debt/GDP ratio.  Were this to
happen, failure to join EMU would be regarded by future generations as a
truly calamitous decision.  It is worth keeping in mind that, without the15
disciplining effect of the Maastricht criteria on Irish fiscal policy, the
economic boom would never have happened.  Our present prosperity and
competitive exchange rate are, to a significant extent, the consequence of
the government's commitment to participate in EMU.  Take away this
commitment and the Irish economy might quickly cease being an
international success story.  This is the basic flaw in the "if it ain't broke,
don't fix it" argument for staying out of EMU.
Third, the picture promoted by critics of EMU of a high-octane Irish
central bank, fine tuning the economy from year to year and providing soft
landings or quick recoveries a la carte, is not entirely plausible.  This
strand in the anti-EMU case relies on an exaggerated faith in the
effectiveness of counter-cyclical monetary policy.  The Federal Reserve
Bank in the United States, of course, operates such a system quite
successfully.  But for a small open country it is a different matter.  The
problem is that adjusting interest rates according to the cyclical pattern of
the economy can generate large, and often uncontrollable, swings in the
exchange rate.  Business in these countries generally dislikes exchange
rate volatility and uncertainty, which explains why companies tend to
favour the EMU project (Britain and Sweden not excepted).  Studies of the
economics of introducing a flexible exchange rate regime in Ireland have
repeatedly rejected this option on the grounds that exchange rate
uncertainty of such a regime would impose excessive costs on our trade
and foreign investment.
Some critics of EMU recommend that the central bank should focus on an
effective exchange rate target for the Irish pound, thus steering a middle16
course between fluctuations in sterling and the euro.  But the closer the
bank sticks to the middle course in exchange rate policy, the more
circumscribed its power to alter interest rates and implement strong
counter-cyclical monetary policies.
A curious aspect of the EMU debate in Ireland is that while opponents
criticise it on the grounds that it will be bad for Irish business, Irish
business itself has generally been strongly supportive of the government's
position!
3  So also has the Irish voter.  There is, for example, the plain fact
that the Maastricht referendum in 1992 recorded a 'yes' vote of just under
70% of all votes cast.  Some opponents of EMU brush this result aside on
the basis that the Irish people did not know what they were voting for.
Fortunately for democracy, our politicians and civil servants are unable to
dismiss a referendum vote so lightly.  Besides, why were the people not
informed of the downsides?  Criticisms of the Irish government's strategy
towards EMU have come too late.
4  In retrospect, it is a pity that the these
valid and important criticisms were not fully debated, and alternative
strategies proposed, prior to, rather than after, the 1992 referendum.
A further consideration is that Structural Funds, especially those received
during the 1990s, were designed to assist Ireland in its professed objective
of building up its economic strength and participating fully in EMU.
Having received, and spent, this assistance, and subsequently prospered
                                                       
3 Ireland's main business and employer organisation, IBEC, has been a pro-active and
unequivocal supporter of participation in EMU in the first round.  Small business
organisations have, perhaps not surprisingly, been more tentative.
4  It is certainly true that the implications of a UK opt-out were not properly debated in the
referendum, or even discussed in the government's White Paper preceding it.  Reasons for
this are discussed in McAleese (1996b).17
and passed the Maastricht criteria with flying colours, could an Irish
government credibly declare that it had changed its mind and had decided
not to join after all, until the UK joins too?  After all the sterling factor and
the "asymmetric shocks" problem have not hit us out of the blue.  More
important would such a policy reversal not go against the whole thrust of
Irish political economy over the past 30 years which has been to lessen our
economic dependence on Britain and establish an independent role on a
broader international stage?  Finally, following this argument, should more
account not be taken of the likelihood that Ireland's economic relations
with continental Europe are strengthening all the time and will strengthen
further as a result of EMU?  Hence past cyclical and trade patterns may
not be reliable indicators of future trends.
To summarise, the ineffectiveness of the anti-EMU case can be traced to
three main defects.  One relates to timing – the anti-arguments have come
too late in the decision-making process.  Another defect relates to content.
The economic arguments against EMU are substantive, but not
compelling.  A final problem concerns perspective.  A decision to go into
or stay out of EMU should not be dictated by short-term considerations,
whether they be the specific sterling exchange rate in any month or the
existence or absence of a housing boom in Dublin in a particular year.
This is a long-run strategic decision of immense importance for the future.
A policy reversal on EMU at this stage would require the articulation of an
alternative strategy for Ireland's long run development, not just a simple
"no".  However, even if it has not succeeded in reversing policy, the
vigorous statement of the anti-EMU case has certainly been worthwhile, if18
only to alert the public to the existence of serious dangers in EMU and to
the need for institutional and structural change to deal with them.
Ireland is ineluctably drawn towards early participation in the single
currency.  Over the long run, EMU could result in a consolidation of the
benefits of fiscal consolidation, low inflation and fast growth experienced
in recent years.  But we are speaking of probabilities, not certainties.
Much will depend on how the levers of domestic policy still left to us are
deployed - incomes policy, education and infrastructure policy, tax policy
for instance.   If the UK stays out of EMU over the long term and sterling
is volatile, Irish business and employees (and their trade unions) will have
to be prepared to respond far more flexibly than in the past.  But for
Ireland, the question now is not whether, but how, to adapt to the new
disciplines and opportunities which EMU will impose.
Conclusions
Two key global trends in recent years have been: (i) the liberalisation of
economies to give greater scope to market forces and (ii) the globalisation
of markets.  The growing importance of European integration for the Irish
economy is the mirror image of processes affecting many countries
throughout the world.  Ireland’s integration, not just with Europe but with
overseas markets generally, has grown at an extraordinary pace.  The next
step after EMU will be the further enlargement of the EU, from its present
15 members to 20, to include the more developed east European countries.
Not long after that an Union of 26 members is on the cards.  By then, the
EU will have become a truly major economic power, and Ireland will19
increasingly have assumed the features of a tiny regional economy of the
EU.
As a regional economy of a vastly enlarged and more market-driven EU,
Ireland will have to survive without many of the supports it has enjoyed
over the past 25 years.  Structural funds are in process of being phased
out, following our graduation into the higher income league.  The days of
large inflows to our farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy are
likewise numbered.  If things go wrong, fiscal policy will be severely
circumscribed and there will be no friendly and familiar Irish Central Bank
to adjust interest rates suited to our needs.  In this regard, it is vitally
important that Ireland should be allowed to maintain its favorable
corporation tax regime.  At present, the government has proposed altering
the 10% corporations profits tax to a general rate of 12.5% applicable to
all businesses.  This proposal is currently under scrutiny in Brussels.
Integration in the European economy needs to be managed correctly.
There is no evidence that jobs in an integrated economy are less secure
than in a protected one.  Also, as experience over the past 25 years has
demonstrated, while exposure to overseas markets has made the Irish
economy more vulnerable to external fluctuations, the trade-off has been
an improvement in living standards, health and education level which more
than compensates.  True the penalty for policy mistakes is likely to
increase as a result of integration.  But provided such mistakes are
avoided, further improvements in living standards are certainly likely.
Greater access to knowledge and technology, the stimulus of competition
with world class rivals, the resource allocation gains from being able to20
trade at world prices and better access to the global pool of saving -- these
will remain the core sources of economic growth (McAleese, 1997).
Economic forces are notoriously two-handed.  For every opportunity there
is a challenge; and few economic changes leave everyone a winner.
Continued growth for the Irish economy will depend on the ability of firms
in Ireland to grasp the opportunities, and on the ability of Irish
policymakers to make Ireland an attractive location for export business.21
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